G20 and Tax competition: What is the Contribution of Global Tax Governance to the G20 Agenda?

The Argentinian Presidency of the G20 has engaged think thanks and leading experts (task forces) from around the world to provide valuable analysis to the G20 dialogue and produce ideas which contribute to the achievement of concrete and sustainable policies (T20 Argentina ).

The first meeting of the T20 took place in February at the Inception Workshop in February in Buenos Aires (Argentina). Another meeting is taking place at the end of May at the Global Solutions Summit in Berlin (Germany) and a final meeting will take place in September in Buenos Aires (Argentina). The full text of the policy briefs is available online.

The task force dealing with taxation combines trade, investment and tax cooperation. As stated in the T20 website “This Task Force will examine how to encourage a rules-based multilateral trade system that broadens the benefits of economic integration while providing the tools to protect those that are hurt by globalization. It will also provide policy recommendations to further advance the international G20 tax agenda”.

One of the topics addressed in 2018 by this task force is tax competition. For the research project GLOBTAXGOV that aims to investigate international tax law making by the OECD, G20 and EU, this task force was a good opportunity to explore ideas of tax competition and global tax governance.

In the policy brief on tax competition, it was highlighted the differences in the implementation of BEPS that lead to undesired forms of tax competition. Some of these differences have been highlighted in the past in a comparative research on the implementation of BEPS 4 Minimum Standards in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. See Mosquera Valderrama I.J. Output Legitimacy Deficits and the Inclusive Framework of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative.

In the said article, the analysis of the implementation of BEPS demonstrated that a one-size-fits all approach does not work. Consequently, the OECD and the BEPS Inclusive Framework should consider the differences between countries, which may result in a different implementation of the BEPS four minimum standards. This article also calls “for tailored solutions for developing countries, which should include a regional approach due to the different needs of African English-speaking countries, African French-speaking Countries, Latin American and Caribbean countries, and Central and Eastern European countries. The lack of regional tax coordination has been addressed by Asian countries, which are very concerned regarding the differences among the countries in the region and their different needs. This concern also applies to countries in Africa, and in Central America and Latin America. As a result, the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative should be tailored to the needs of developing countries and more specific to the countries in these regions”.

Following this research, we submitted in the policy brief that there are distortions in tax competition created by the differences in implementation of BEPS. We argue that balancing competition and BEPS implementation is needed to achieve a global model of tax governance in which developed and developing countries compete on a level playing field. This new model is based on experimental theories of governance. These experimental theories will result in a framework of goal-setting and the revision through comparative review of implementation experience in diverse local (country) contexts, which will be adapted to the OECD and the G20 roles in global tax governance.

Therefore, in the policy brief on tax competition we “ask the G20 leaders to promote regional cooperation in the implementation of international standards, including BEPS. The G20 should facilitate the creation of regional (or, for that matter, sub-regional) peer review and consultancy mechanisms that would allow countries to set and revise their own goals and targets for implementation, getting regular feedback from neighboring countries”. The full text of the policy brief is available online and also in this blog.G20 Policy brief Tax Competition

The policy brief was discussed at the Global Solutions Summit in a panel with Michael Lennard UN, Nara Monkam ATAF, Pascal Saint-Amans OECD and Edmund Fitzgerald ICRICT. Therefore, the content of the policy brief and the recommendations have received the attention by  international and regional organizations and by think-tanks.

To sum up in order to solve the tensions originated from the setting of international tax standards by the OECD and G20, in the tax competition policy brief a new model of global tax governance is proposed. For this, we need experts in political science, taxation, international relations and international political economy. Let’s discuss global tax governance!!

 

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Good Governance in Tax Matters

I am currently working on two papers on good governance in tax matters for EU countries and for non-EU (third) countries, and after doing a lot of reading on the topic, I just realized that I needed to go back to an article that I wrote in 2010, at the time that all developments of exchange of information started (Irma Johanna Mosquera Valderrama , EU and OECD Proposals for International Tax Cooperation: A New Road? Tax Notes International, Volume 59, Number 8 August 23, 2010).  See picture below for the main elements of the 2010 Parliament Resolution as described in my 2010 article.

I also realized that it took almost 9 years for the EU to effectively enforce this standard  of good tax governance with non-EU (third) countries (see 2009 Communication (COM(2009) 201 final) and 2010 Parliament Resolution (European Parliament Resolution, Feb. 10, 2010, on Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters; P7 TA 2010 (0020)).

The actions that are currently in the spotlight are the list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions (as of May 25, 2018 being reduced to 7 countries http://http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/05/25/taxation-2-jurisdictions-removed-from-eu-list-of-non-cooperative-jurisdictions/), the use of the code of conduct, and the introduction of a good tax governance clause in agreements concluded with third countries. These actions were already suggested in the EU Parliament Resolution of February 2010, so what is new in all this discussion of good governance in tax matters?

My view is that what is new is the political commitment of EU countries to these developments and their willingness to submit a list of countries as non-cooperative tax jurisdictions.

More to be presented: For non-EU (third) countries  at the Jean Monnet Network ‘The European Union at the Crossroads of Global Order’ EUCROSS (http://https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/research/eucross/conference-programme-final.pdf) conference in Hong Kong June 2018:The EU and its Partners in Global Governance: Trade, Investment, Taxation and Sustainable Development.

For EU countries at the European Consortium for Political Research ECPR  panel on Change and Stability in Global Tax Policy  http://https://ecpr.eu/Events/EventDetails.aspx?EventID=115 in Hamburg August 2018 for EU countries.  

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Multilateral solutions as regional solutions?

The BEPS Project is regarded as a multilateral solution to prevent base erosion and profit shifting, but is the BEPS solution truly multilateral?

By Irma Johanna Mosquera Valderrama

In principle, the adoption of the OECD-BEPS Inclusive Framework by more than 113 countries (March 2018) demonstrates the level of support from developing and developed countries, including EU countries, to the adoption of the international standards of the BEPS Actions. But one interesting question that requires further research is: Are these standards truly international or do the regional and unilateral solutions play a role in the way that these standards are implemented in the countries?

For instance, I have observed while analysing the implementation of the BEPS in the Netherlands since 2015 until now, that at EU level the Dutch government is in favour of the implementation of the BEPS Actions through the EU Directives. For the Dutch government, the EU Directives are hard law measures that can safeguard the principles of equality and certainty for the taxpayer (Documents of the Second Chamber of Parliament, 2017-2018, no. 794). The Netherlands is currently in the process of transposing the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives (ATAD 1 and ATAD 2) into its domestic legislation. The legislative proposals are expected to be submitted to the Second Chamber of Parliament before the summer of 2018 (ATAD 1) and by 2019 (ATAD 2). Since these Directives go beyond the BEPS Actions by introducing measures such as exit taxation and a general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR), it is expected that the implementation of the BEPS Actions in the Netherlands will have some regional EU elements. Non-EU countries, therefore, should be aware of these developments.

Furthermore, the current discussion at OECD level and at EU level on the digital economy will generate a similar question: are EU countries following the EU proposal for a virtual permanent establishment or will EU countries follow the OECD-BEPS Project, mainly its Action 1 and Action 7?

Some challenges are expected as a post written by Wouter Lips in the GLOBTAXGOV blog shows: “International tax policy making is messy and complicated and made in multiple rivaling policy arenas (OECD, EU-level, US, UN, national legislations, …) at the same time”.

In this discussion, countries are also taking unilateral measures that may conflict with their international commitments. For instance, Italy has chosen to adopt a new definition of permanent establishment that will also affect e-commerce and the digital economy.  In a post in the GLOBTAXGOV blog, Enza Sonetti rightly asks how this new definition of permanent establishment will be reconciled with the choices and reservations made by Italy in the BEPS Multilateral Instrument?

 International tax lawmaking

These developments also add to the complexity of the implementation of BEPS. In a recent article that I wrote in the framework of the GLOBTAXGOV project, I showed that countries are taking different approaches to the implementation of BEPS. One question that should also be considered is how the different implementation of BEPS by the countries and developments in the EU will influence international tax lawmaking. This question will be further researched in the GLOBTAXGOV project.

In order to enhance cooperation between GLOBTAXGOV blog and the Leiden law blog, this blogpost has been also published at the Leiden law blog  http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/multilateral-solutions-as-regional-solutions

 

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Is Italy’s new definition of Permanent Establishment the right solution to prevent tax avoidance in digital economy?

Enza Sonetti – 17/4/2018

Italian Budget Law has amended the domestic definition of Permanent Establishment (PE) to prevent artificial avoidance of PE status and make national legislation consistent with OECD’s Final Report on BEPS Action 7 and the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS (MLI). The new definition has come into force on January 2018 and it is expected to have a considerable impact on Permanent Establishment status but its application to Italy’s existing tax treaties may be complicated due to the reservations to MLI submitted.

The new version of art. 162 of Italian Consolidated Text on Direct Taxation, extends the PE concept and covers hypothesis in which a foreign company has a significant business in Italy even though it has no physical establishment there. The amendment refers indeed, to the significant and continuous economic presence within Italian territory of a subsidiary that is set up in a way not to result as physically present in Italy. It is evident, thus, how this new concept will affect e-commerce and digital economy and help to avoid the presence of hidden PE.

Moreover, the Budget Law has modified the negative list provided by art. 162 that specifies the cases in which a fixed-base does not constitute a PE: Italy, in this respect, has decided to adopt a case by case approach as the character of preparatory or auxiliary activities that would exclude the existence of a PE, needs to be verified with reference to parent company’s activity. On the other hand, pursuant to art.13 of MLI and to tackle tax avoidance strategies, has been introduced an anti-fragmentation rule aiming to prevent artificial fragmentation of activities that, considered together or aggregated would constitute a PE.

The reform has also reviewed the notion of the dependent agent, designing a detailed definition more consistent with Final report on Action 7. According to this new definition, a person constitutes a PE if he acts on behalf of a non-resident corporation and habitually executes contracts or is involved in the conclusion of contracts without any possibility to make substantial changes to them. To tax law purposes a PE exists also if the agent is controlled by a foreign company or both are under the control of a third party that owns more than 50% of voting rights in the other.

The amendments introduced, implement the principles set in Final Report on Action 7 but need to be coordinated with MLI to which Italy, has expressed the right of not applying the entirety of articles 12 and 14 of the Convention to its Covered Tax Agreements. Therefore, they represent a relevant but a unilateral step towards the rationalisation of international tax governance and show the contradictions of autonomous strategies. Italy indeed expands the national definition of PE but on the other hand, expresses reservations and option to MLI that may provoke the unwelcome effect of not taxing incomes deriving from a different or new type of PE that should instead fall within the scope of the Convention.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Enza Sonetti received a joint- PhD (2017) in Legal Strategy for SMEs from Suor Orsola Benincasa University of Naples and in Law and Political Science from the University of Barcelona. She currently works at AGM Abogados SL-Barcelona . Her research interests are focused on European Tax law, SMEs taxation, cooperative compliance systems, factors influencing taxpayers’ behaviour and tax penalties.

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What does agenda-setting theory teach us about the digital economy tax proposals?

Wouter Lips- 16/4/2018

Problems and inadequacies of applying the common OECD tax standards to an increasingly digitalized economy have been predicted for nearly 20 years 1. Yet, The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) outcomes did not provide satisfactory answers to these challenges and the OECD interim report does not give much hope of a breakthrough in 2020. The EU Commission in March released a proposal for a virtual permanent establishment as a long-term common solution, that many appreciate as good rational policy. Yet few people think the proposal has an actual chance of succeeding, pointing to the US who will very likely object to a measure that seems aimed at “their” digital multinationals. Meanwhile, the Commission also proposed an “interim” measure, a three percent tax on the turnover of digital companies with a turnover exceeding 750 million euros, which in absence of permanent agreement could become quite permanent.

International tax policy making is messy and complicated and made in multiple rivaling policy arenas (OECD, EU-level, US, UN, national legislations, …) at the same time. The eventual policy makers, (ECOFIN ministers), themselves often are not tax technical experts – they are often not experts in many subjects they cover – and do not have time to become so. Therefore they rely on limited resources and imperfect information when deciding policy. Moreover, both left- and right-wing politicians have interest beyond choosing the most adequate or equitable tax policy: being seen “doing something” about tax scandals, returning favors to business lobbyist, protectionist tendencies, ideological interests, etc… Economist Herbert Simon 2 dubbed this situation “bounded rationality”, where individuals’ rational decision-making ability is impaired by time, resource and cognitive factors. In this view, decision makers prefer satisfactory solutions to optimum ones.

Political scientists have been trying to capture the complexity of policy making in light of limited resources, multiple arenas and bounded rationality. These frameworks act as lenses that provide richer explanations of the messiness of politics than rationalist behavior of functionalist explanations can.

One such lens political scientist use is the Multiple Streams Framework developed by John W. Kingdon 3. Kingdon tried to explain why some ideas made it to the top of the policy-makers agenda while others didn’t. Some ideas could be out there for decades without ever getting enacted, while sometimes out-of-the blue a new policy could be agreed upon in a matter of weeks.

Kingdon divided the agenda setting process into three independent “streams”. The first one he identifies is the problem stream. It consists of the issues policy makers pay attention to. Policy makers naturally have limited attention spans and not every issue stays at the forefront of their thoughts. International tax policy for example sees a surge in the problem stream after each tax scandal, and then slowly returns under the radar.

The second one, policy stream, consists of all the rivaling ideas that are floating around in the “policy primeval soup”. These ideas can be developed by policy administrations, think thanks, NGO’s, academia,… In digital tax policy, a wide range of ideas float around: The Common Consolidated Tax Base, virtual PE, Destination-based Cash flow taxes and border-adjustment taxes, extended profit splits… An idea like unitary taxation has been around since the 1930’s and pops up every now and again. Most recently by the report of the independent commission for the reform of international corporate taxation 4, yet it does not seem its time has come already.

The political stream is the third relevant stream. Kingdon defined movements in this stream mainly as domestic administrative and legislative turnovers, but changing political constellations apply to international or multilateral politics as well. The election of Emmanuel Macron as president of France, and his good relationship with Angela Merkel has clearly given a higher profile to tax policy in the EU for example.

Another important concept for Kingdon is coupling. The three streams move independently and with different dynamics, but there are instances in which they coincidently align. In such cases, a window of opportunity arises in which skillful policy entrepreneurs (which can be policy makers, but not always) can couple the three streams to move their favored policy to the top of the agenda.

Take FATCA for example. The idea of automatic exchange of information has been kept alive in the US during the 2000s in the policy stream by politicians such as Senator Carl Levin and NGO’s such as Global Financial Integrity. In 2009 a democratic congress and democratic presidency made for a favorable political stream. The Financial Crisis, the UBS banking scandal and Sen. Levins’ hearings opened up the problem stream. This meant a window of opportunity existed during 2009-2010 for automatic exchange of information. An example of skillful policy entrepreneurship is the tacking-on of FATCA on the HIRE employment restoration act. A separate FATCA law would have meant scrutiny in the Ways and Means committee where it would have led to much more resistance. Making it a part of the HIRE act meant it was handled in the Appropriations committee, out of the eye of the tax experts in congress, strongly improving its eventual chances of enactment.

So what can Kingdon teach us about the likability of the EU digital proposals passing? First of all, we have to identify the policy arenas where this process plays out. The most obvious is the EU itself. The second arena where these policies will have to be decided is the OECD task force on digital economy in 2020. A third relevant policy arena are the EU-US external relationships. The digital tax proposals are seen by the US as a GAFA (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) cash grab, and not every EU country is prepared to let relations with the US sour over tax policy.

When weighing both policy proposals in the policy stream, the digital revenue taxation route is generally not seen as a viable or adequate solution for the problems of digitalization and corporate taxation. Nevertheless, several countries have recognized them as temporary solutions, as the OECD interim report5 indicates. The virtual PE concept has also been floating in policy circles for quite some time. It was hinted at during BEPS for example, and it is discussed frequently in the OECD digital economy public consultation submissions. This indicates that stakeholders are anticipating and debating the introduction of such changes to the PE definition.

In the political stream, both proposals however are facing rabid opposition in all three arenas. Within the EU, there is heavy opposition from Ireland, Belgium, The Netherlands and Denmark against the interim measures. While a bloc of Central European countries fear that the thresholds in the virtual PE proposals might mean that small countries will get cut off from their fair share of the tax6. While the leadership of Macron has given a new dynamic to corporate taxation of digital giants in the EU, it is unknown if this opposition can be overcome.

In the OECD arena, the interim report and presentation released in March ’18 clearly delineated three groups of countries who basically “agreed to disagree” on the desirability of interim measures5, while a long-term proposal is to be delivered in 2020. In this forum, no consensus is present at the moment either. The US is staunchly against both proposals. Under the Obama administration, there already was irritation at what was perceived as the EU singling out US Multinationals7 . The Trump administration, which has a far more zero-sum view on economic matters, will be undoubtedly aggravated and might even retaliate. Germany fears this last scenario might play out in trade and tariff disputes6.

Whether or not entirely true, the framing of the digital tax proposals as cash grabs is very tenacious. While Pierre Moscovici is being very staunch in his communication that non-EU digital firms will also be targeted, French ministers have been on record applauding the “GAFA”-tax.  The inability to change this framing can be seen as bad policy entrepreneurship on the EU’s side.

However, within the EU politically, the interim tax proposal has one edge over the virtual PE proposal: it can still be done unilaterally or through enhanced cooperation if nine countries agree to it. One Commission official even went on record saying that if there is not agreement in the Council of Ministers on the temporary measures by the end of 2018, there will be a move towards enhanced cooperation” 8. We will probably see at least some countries within the EU go through with a form of revenue tax for digital economy, even in absence of EU agreement.

With regards to the problem stream, it is difficult to predict windows of opportunities and how long they will keep open. Right now, there seems to be an opening. We’re still in the wake of the paradise papers scandal, and the recent Facebook scandal have a lot of politicians worried about the adverse effects of digital giants on societies. A digital revenue tax in the eyes of policy makers could also function as a symbolic measure to show the primacy of politics and that even mega-companies are subject to the law. Because of Fear of populism and Brexit, pro-EU politicians also need a victory to show a rationale for the EU. A tax on digital companies that seem to exist above nation states, may fit that need.

It’s impossible to predict if this opportunity will still exist two years down the road, when the long-term proposal has to be agreed upon in the OECD. There is however a distinct possibility that it won’t and that taxation of the digital sector will be off the public agenda for other items of the day. In that case, it seems unlikely that EU negotiators will want to spend much political capital against the US to push the long-term proposal of a virtual PE.

Interim proposal (revenue taxes) Long-term proposal (virtual PE)
Policy Stream Generally seen as unsound policy, but gets more traction around the world Generally seen as rational policy, hinted at repeatedly and anticipated upon in OECD.
Political Stream Can be introduced unilaterally or though coalition of the willing. Requires EU consensus

Requires US approval

Requires OECD consensus

Problem Stream On the agenda now, in wake of several tax and Facebook scandals Won’t be on agenda until 2020, window might close

 

In conclusion, while policy-wise a revenue tax is hands down a worse outcome than the proposal of a digital PE, the political constellation is far more favorable to the first idea. While right now, a window of opportunity due to the three streams coupling seems to exist, and France is showing leadership on the issue, it might not be down the road. It seems that the revenue tax proposal has a chance of being realized, at least in some large EU countries. This moment might be long gone when it’s time for the long-term proposals to be negotiated within the OECD, while opposition from the US is likely to remain rampant.  As many commenters predict, the interim proposal will very likely become quite permanent.

Literature

  1. Mclure C. Implementing state corporate income taxes in the digital age. Natl Tax J. 2000;53(4):1287-1305.
  2. Simon H a. Rational Decision-Making in Business Organizations. In: Nobel Memorial Lecture, 8 December, 1978. ; 1978. doi:10.2307/1808698.
  3. Kingdon J. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Second Edition. Essex: Pearson; 2014.
  4. Faccio T, Picciotto S, Brockmeyer A, et al. Alternatives to the Separate Entity / Arm ’ s Length Principle. 2017;ICRIT.
  5. OECD. OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018.; 2018. doi:10.1787/9789264293083-en.
  6. Plucinska J, Vinocur N, Smith-Meyer B. Europe’s digital tax map: Where countries stand. Polit EU. 2018. https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-digital-tax-map-where-countries-stand-analysis-deep-divisions/. Accessed April 16, 2018.
  7. US Department of the Treasury. The European Commission’s Recent State Aid Investigations of Transfer Pricing Rulings. White Pap. 2016.
  8. Kirwin J. EU to Impose Two New Taxes on Digital Giants. Bloomberg. 2018. https://www.bna.com/eu-impose-two-n57982088898/. Accessed April 16, 2018.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Wouter Lips   is a PhD candidate, funded by the Flanders Research Network, and a member of the Ghent Insitute for International Studies at Ghent University. His PhD project focuses on the political economy of the G20 tax agenda with regards to automatic exchange of information and BEPS.

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What are the spill-over effects of Member States’ tax treaties on developing countries?

More than 60 participants from some EU member and accession countries, academia, scholars, and business discussed the spill-over effects of Member States’ tax treaties on developing countries. This workshop took place under the EU Fiscalis 2020 programme in Podgorica, Montenegro March 15-16 2018.  https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/fiscalis-programme/fiscalis-2020-programme_en

We discussed in the first panel the challenges for developing countries regarding tax treaties and implementation of BEPS.In my presentation I addressed the advantages and disadvantages of entering into a tax treaty including also how the multilateral developments are changing tax treaties. In addition, I discussed how BEPS Actions have been implemented in developing countries so far and how should developing countries benefit from them? The main focus was on  treaty abuse since for developing countries the interaction between BEPS treaty abuse measures (PPT and LOB), treaty measures (main purpose, LOB) and national general anti-avoidance rules GAAR should be taken into account. Different choices are being made by the countries in the implementation of BEPS treaty abuse measures and these choices will also need to be reconciled with the country’ tax treaties network and with the country’ domestic GAARs.

A nice opportunity to present the ERC GLOBTAXGOV research project and the countries’ choices on BEPS.  Presentation available Mosquera Montenegro TAX TREATIES

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Innovation Week IP & Tax Policy

During the Innovation Week IP & Tax Policy at McGill University in Montreal, Canada, I addressed the international (BEPS Action 5) and European standards dealing with IP preferential regimes and their implications for developing countries.

In respect of IP preferential regimes, countries including developing countries should aim to find the right balance between granting tax incentives and to protect their tax base.

Some of the outstanding questions regarding the international tax standards in respect of IP preferential regimes are (i)  Is abolishing the IP regimes the solution?(ii) how to redesign an IP regime that is compliant with Action 5 Minimum Standard? (ii) how to ensure IP protection?

My presentation titled Evolving International Rules and Standards for Taxing IP is available online. Mosquera IP & TAX POLICY INNOVATION WEEK

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Who Pays for Canada? Taxes & Fairness

This presentation addressed the role of National Governments in Global Tax Governance: How to achieve fairness and equality? Some of the issues addressed during this presentation are:  Canada as a country member of the G20 and the OECD has an active role in the setting of international tax standards for developed and developing countries and therefore, the questions that need to be addressed are: What can Canada do to contribute to enhance fairness and equality in the international tax standards developed by the OECD and G20? What can Canada do to contribute to address the concerns of developing countries? Link to the conference:http://mcgill.ca/misc/events/2018-annual-conference

My presentation is available online.  Mosquera McGill Canada Taxes and Fairness February 2018

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G20 Inception Workshop: Task force on trade, investment and taxation

The journey in the GLOBTAXGOV project started with the G20 task force trade, investment and tax cooperation in which I am currently participating with some policy recommendations on tax competition, global tax governance and developing countries. 

Argentina has the presidency of the G20 for 2018, and therefore, in February 2018, a  T20 Argentina Inception Workshop: Vision and Strategies was organized in Buenos Aires, Argentina. This workshop was a preparatory meeting for the general meeting of task forces to take place in September 2018. In this workshop, 149 think tanks from 45 countries from around the world were participating to produce recommendations for the G20 to improve global governance and the general welfare of humanity. This is the first time that this meeting took place in Latin America, and therefore it was very nice opportunity to include also developing countries perspective in the task forces that will provide recommendations for the G20. 

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Welcome to the GLOBTAXGOV blog

This blog is part of the ERC research project GLOBTAXGOV. This blog aims to set up an alternative platform for discussion among scholars, governments, international organizations, research institutions regarding the setting of international tax standards by the OECD, G20 and the EU. This blog will be fed by experts in governance, tax law, and international relations. This blog also aims to exchange experiences to establish a dialogue in tax governance and to disseminate the project GLOBTAXGOV.

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