Global Tax Governance: Legitimacy and Inclusiveness. Why it matters

By Irma Mosquera

This is a transcript of Prof. dr. Irma Mosquera Valderrama’s Inaugural Lecture at Leiden University, delivered on 30 June 2023 at 4pm at the Academiegebouw in Leiden. The book version can be downloaded here. Recording inaugural lecture available here


Since February 2018 when I started my GLOBTAXGOV Project, I have been searching for the conditions under which a model of global tax governance can be feasible and legitimate for both developed and developing countries. But the question that I want to address here is: why it matters. Why do we discuss global tax governance, legitimacy and inclusiveness? What has changed in international taxation, that makes that nowadays we cannot address taxation without addressing the political dimension of it.

1. International Political developments

In 2016, Thomas Rixen and Peter Dietsch, in their book ‘Global Tax Governance: What is Wrong with It and How to Fix It’, defined global tax governance as consisting “of the set of institutions governing issues of taxation that involve cross-border transactions or have other international implications. This definition implies that global tax governance need not, but could, involve a full or partial shift of the power to tax, that is, the right to impose taxes on citizens, to the international level[1].

Since the 2008 financial crisis, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with the political mandate of the G20 have introduced international tax standards, first standard of exchange of information, thereafter the BEPS Project including 4 Minimum Standards, 10 Best Practices and 1 Multilateral Instrument to tackle tax avoidance by multinationals.

In my view, when addressing the introduction of these international tax standards from the perspective of global tax governance and using the definition of Rixen and Dietsch, it means then, that there is a shift of the power to tax from countries to international organizations (the OECD) and political forum (the G20).

The OECD claimed they did so with the political mandate of the G20 and by inviting non-OECD, non-G20 countries to participate in these initiatives, developed and developing countries will benefit since exchange of information and less tax avoidance will raise more revenue by countries. This revenue could be used for public services (health, education, etc.) but also to contribute to fairness of taxation vis-à-vis citizens who were suffering from the consequences of the financial crisis. In short, more transparency meant more money for countries to overcome the problems created by financial crisis.

In both cases, the result is the OECD with the political mandate of the G20 introducing international tax standards that non-OECD, non-G20 countries are implementing throughout their membership to networks or by signing multilateral instruments/conventions.

  • For the standard of exchange of information, the Global Transparency Forum with 160 tax jurisdictions[2], the endorsement of the Common Reporting Standards, and the signature of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.
  • For the BEPS Project, the BEPS Inclusive Framework with 143 tax jurisdictions (as of June 2023)[3] and the BEPS Multilateral Instrument signed by more than 100 tax jurisdictions.

Countries participating in the Global Transparency Forum and the BEPS Inclusive Framework have also agreed to be reviewed by their peers (peer review) on their commitment to these standards. However, unlike treaties where you sign the treaty and it has an effect for both/or multiple parties, the BEPS 4 Minimum Standards are regarded as soft law since these Standards are not binding for countries. So in principle countries are not required to implement these standards, but they do so, why? Some of the reasons that I have found in my research are:

  • chance and necessity (technical assistance by developed countries and/or OECD, and twinning projects between developed and developing countries);
  • expected efficacy of the law (access to information by tax administrations on multinationals);
  • political, economical and reputational incentives (commitment to the EU Standard of Tax Good Governance in trade, partnership agreements to receive EU funding and to be excluded of the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions).

Due to the increase of digital business prior to the COVID 19 Pandemic, countries decided to address this issue. After several proposals from the OECD Secretariat, OECD countries, non-OECD countries[4], in 2021, 137 of the 141 countries[5] belonging to the BEPS Inclusive Framework (at that time) reached a political agreement to introduce measures to tax highly digitalized business (Pillar 1) and to introduce a global minimum tax rate of 15% (GloBE Pillar 2). The number has now increased to 139, since the inclusive framework has also increased to 143 countries jurisdictions.[6]

The legitimacy of all of these political developments by the OECD, G20 and the BEPS Inclusive Framework has been (and still is) questioned by scholars, civil society, countries, regional tax organizations and regional organizations. My research in the GLOBTAXGOV research project, and my Leiden Chair on Tax Governance investigate under what conditions this shift of power can be legitimate and feasible vis-à-vis non-OECD, non-G20 countries including developing countries.

In order to define legitimacy, I have used political science scholarship, i.e. Scharpf’s concept of input and output legitimacy[7] and Schmidt’s concept of throughput legitimacy.[8] In short, legitimacy provides for a framework to evaluate the participation and representation in decision making (i.e. input legitimacy), the outcome being useful for all stakeholders (output legitimacy) and the process being transparent, inclusive, and open (throughput legitimacy).

These questions on feasibility and legitimacy are even more relevant now in the midst of the discussions taking place since November 2022 at the United Nations level. These discussions have been initiated by Nigeria with the support of some African countries. These countries submitted a proposal for a draft resolution at the UN Second Committee on the “Promotion of Inclusive and Effective International Tax Cooperation at the United Nations” by means of developing a framework or instrument. This resolution has been approved by the General Assembly in December 2022. This resolution gives the United Nations, a more important role in the setting of international tax standards.

Following this resolution, input has been sought (i) on the content of this framework or instrument (either a multilateral convention or a multilateral instrument such as the BEPS MLI) and (ii) on the role of the United Nations to achieve inclusive and effective international tax cooperation.[9] A virtual consultation with UN countries and other stakeholders took place end May 2023. At this time, the UN is developing this framework, and further consultations will take place in July 2023.

This is not the first time; efforts have been made to give importance to the United Nations. At the 2015 Addis Tax Initiative, it was proposed to give to the UN Tax Committee the status of an intergovernmental body. The proposal was rejected by some developed countries (at that time) due to the predominant role of the OECD in tax matters.

Given the political developments and the voice raised by scholars, civil society and countries (unilaterally or in regional settings), this new development at the United Nations could shift the decision-making process from the OECD-G20 towards the United Nations. But of course, we will have to wait and see.

In my view, we need to continue engaging all stakeholders (business, countries, civil society, international organizations, regional (tax) organizations, supranational organizations) while discussing these international political developments.

2. EU political developments and the EU Standard of Tax Good Governance

At EU level, the EU Commission has introduced the BEPS 4 Minimum Standards and some of the BEPS best practices in the form of a directive. The Directives are applicable to EU countries (e.g. Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 1; Directive on Administrative Cooperation 1 to 6[10]) and also to non-EU countries (Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 2).

With the aim to play a more important role in the international tax developments vis-à-vis non-EU countries, the EU Commission has also introduced in 2008 the EU Standard of Tax Good Governance that provided for transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition. Since 2018 this Standard also includes countries commitment to the BEPS 4 Minimum Standards. This Standard of Tax Good Governance is introduced in economic/trade/partnership agreements with third (non-EU) countries, as well as one pre-condition to receive EU aid and to be excluded from the blacklist of non-cooperative jurisdictions.[11]

In light of the above, my research in the GLOBTAXGOV research project and my chair on tax governance also investigates (in addition to the role of the OECD and the G20 mentioned above) under what conditions the role of the EU in international tax law making can be legitimate and feasible vis-à-vis non-OECD, non G20 countries?

In 2021, I was awarded an EU Jean Monnet Chair (EUTAXGOV) to raise awareness of the use of the Standard of EU Tax Good Governance and the consequences for non-EU countries including developing countries. Receiving this Jean Monnet Chair shows that research can be translated into teaching. The courses that I teach at Leiden Law School also contribute to raise the awareness of the use of this Standard.[12]

In my view, more research is needed on how these international and EU tax developments have been influenced by political developments, but also on how these developments can be legitimate and feasible vis-à-vis non-OECD, non-G20, non-EU countries. I have started to address these questions with my ERC GLOBTAXGOV (Global Tax Governance) Research project and my Jean Monnet Chair EUTAXGOV (EU Tax Governance). I will continue addressing these questions with my Chair on Tax Governance at Leiden Law School.

3. Global Tax Governance: Legitimacy and Inclusiveness: Why it matters

 Taxation is linked to sovereignty, where countries can decide what rules are needed, and how these rules are implemented. These rules are subject to the trias politica (checks and balances) between the different branches (executive, legislative and judiciary). These rules can be domestic (national/regional/local) rules.

In addition, there are rules applicable to cross-border transactions/activities by non-residents (either individuals or businesses). In order to provide relief of double taxation regarding these cross-border activities/transactions, countries have concluded double tax treaties.

However, the introduction of the standard of transparency and exchange of information as well as the BEPS Project changed this approach. By means of the former, countries were required to exchange information and to repeal their bank secrecy rules, for instance countries such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Uruguay changed their rules to make exchange of information more effective and efficient (swift exchange of information among tax authorities).

With the BEPS Project, countries were required to introduce rules to tackle aggressive tax planning including treaty shopping (Action 6) as well as to facilitate exchange of information of rulings (Action 5), transfer pricing documentation (Action 13), and to repeal harmful tax regimes (Action 5). In addition, countries were required to introduce rules to facilitate the resolution of tax disputes (Action 14).

This brings me to the title of this lecture and the questions addressed at the beginning of this lecture. I will address these questions in the following paragraphs.

From legitimacy…

Scholars, civil society and countries have expressed in articles and meetings at international and regional level their concerns regarding the legitimacy of the BEPS Project vis-à-vis non-OECD, non-G20 countries. Scholars and countries in regional consultations have also addressed issues outside the BEPS Project that are relevant for developing countries such as taxation of informal economy, taxation of capital gains from indirect transfers, among others. Some of these topics are being addressed by international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the United Nations either directly or in the framework of cooperation under the Platform for Collaboration on Tax.

In order to address these concerns, the OECD created the BEPS Inclusive Framework where countries were invited to participate as BEPS Associate and to commit to the implementation of the BEPS 4 Minimum Standards. This implementation is on equal footing and subject to the consensus minus one rule.

This means that upon review of the implementation, the peer review of the country can be adopted even if one country does not agree with it (minus one rule). This country can be most likely the country which is being peer reviewed. The system of peer review and consensus minus one rule was adopted based on the experience of peer review of the standard of transparency and exchange of information. At that time, Uruguay, a country with bank secrecy, opposed to the peer review report, but the report was adopted based on this rule.

As I highlighted in 2015, non-OECD, non-G20 countries including developing countries need to participate in the agenda setting of international tax standards (input legitimacy), and to benefit from these standards (output legitimacy).[13] In my article, I concluded that there is a lack of input and output legitimacy.

Later on, in a 2018 article, after the creation of the BEPS Inclusive Framework, I continue questioning the legitimacy of the BEPS 4 Minimum Standards. At that time, and still applicable, it is not yet clear, whether these BEPS 4 Minimum Standards are what developing countries need? How much revenue has the implementation of the BEPS 4 Minimum Standards raised for developing countries? In the 2018 article, I also concluded (and still applicable) that the fast pace of the implementation of the BEPS 4 Minimum Standards has resulted in developing countries focusing on these standards, while deviating their attention from other priorities, such as taxation of informal economy, tax evasion, digitalization of tax administrations, improving taxpayer compliance among others.[14]

The same discussions/questions on legitimacy can also be raised in respect of the Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 discussions. Therefore, it is for international/regional organizations and governments to find out how countries including developing countries can benefit from these initiatives, and what needs to be done to also give a voice to developing countries. All countries should have a voice, but this also means that training and knowledge is needed so that all countries can exercise that voice.

…to Inclusiveness

In addition to legitimacy, there were other concerns from developing countries including the fast pace of the BEPS Project and the lack of resources (personnel/financial) to participate effectively at the discussions by the BEPS Inclusive Framework (either in Paris (OECD headquarters) or online). Furthermore, some scholars, civil society, and think tanks have highlighted that the main role in international tax policy making should be given to the United Nations.

These concerns have not been addressed with the creation of the BEPS Inclusive Framework, since for the BEPS Project the participation on equal footing was only for the implementation of the BEPS 4 Minimum Standards, and it is not clear if all countries can become a member of the BEPS Inclusive Framework, since it needs approval of all of the other countries participating in this Framework. This is the case of Cyprus that has not been able to join the BEPS Inclusive Framework. To still show its commitment to the BEPS Project, Cyprus has decided to sign the BEPS Multilateral Instrument.

Furthermore, at the start of the discussions between 2018-2019 of Pillar 1 (taxation of highly digitalized business), it was clear that there were three positions (i) from OECD countries, (ii) from the United States and (iii) from G24 countries which are developing countries).[15] Because no consensus was reached, the OECD Secretariat submitted a proposal (end of 2019[16]), which was a combination of the OECD and the United States proposal leaving behind the G24 (developing) countries proposal.[17]

In the midst of these discussions, the United States asked countries to refrain from introducing unilateral measures such as digital service taxes, and if not the US will start section 301 US trade investigations which will result in trade retaliation measures. In 2020, consultations and discussions took place, but without any progress on the adoption of the OECD Secretariat proposal.

However, the situation changed in 2021 with the United States Biden’s presidency. The United States decided to go forward with the implementation of the GLoBE (Pillar 2) proposal and to endorse the Pillar 1 OECD Secretariat proposal. This proposal was discussed at the G7, G20 and thereafter in the BEPS Inclusive Framework.

The result is the political statement agreed in 2021 endorsed by 137 of the 141 jurisdictions participating at the BEPS Inclusive Framework. Since then, the number has raised to 139 with the increase to 143 of the number of countries participating in the BEPS Inclusive Framework.

4 countries did not endorse this political statement, i.e. Nigeria, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Nigeria has expressed that the political outcome is not fair, and therefore, they continue with their own rules (e.g. significant economic presence to tax digital business). Kenya has a digital service tax, so at that moment, it was not considered by policy makers in Kenya that the country should commit to this political statement. However, in the framework of the negotiations of a trade agreement the US has asked Kenya to repeal the digital service tax, and to commit to the political outcome for Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. Kenya’s government has recently expressed that they will follow that path.[18]

Why it matters

Even if at the time that the BEPS Project started in 2013 the OECD developed the BEPS Inclusive Framework to allow participation on equal footing, this participation is only for purposes of the implementation, so I argued back in 2015[19] that there was no participation on the decision-making process. Since then, so many actors have come into place, including also new standards Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, but the question remains the same. In the following paragraphs, I will address some of these questions.

 If the decision making took place at the OECD level with the political mandate of the G20, have non-OECD, non G20 countries truly participated in the decision-making process?

As I have addressed in this lecture, the decision making of the content of the BEPS Project and 15 BEPS Actions was made by the OECD and G20 countries. In my research, I have addressed  that for OECD countries, the BEPS Project was an opportunity to advance in projects that were not broadly implemented, e.g., harmful tax competition, and to take the leading role in international tax matters with the OECD Secretariat, and the Committee of Fiscal Affairs deciding on the agenda/topics to be addressed in the BEPS Project.[20]

Even if countries wanted to participate in this decision-making process it was not possible. As I argued in 2015, membership of the OECD is on invitation only, and it requires an accession process. Even more difficult is to become a member of the G20 which is a political forum, where very few emerging economies participate (e.g., Indonesia, India, China, Brazil, Argentina, etc.). Despite the existence of other political forums with developing countries, e.g., G24 and G77, these forums were not invited to take part in the decision-making process of the BEPS Project.

Furthermore, as it has been mentioned above, even in case of a proposal submitted by developing countries, e.g., G24 countries in Pillar 1 choosing for significant economic presence, this proposal was left behind in the OECD Secretariat proposal which combined the OECD and the United States approach. The significant economic presence has been adopted by countries such as Nigeria, Israel, and also Indonesia (G20 country) and in 2022 Colombia (OECD country).[21] This shows that countries have decided to follow unilaterally the rules that they consider are more convenient for their own economy. This is the case of the significant economic presence and the digital service tax (e.g., Kenya) for taxation of highly digitalized business.

If not, is the creation of networks such as the Global Transparency Forum and BEPS Inclusive Framework enough to justify the legitimacy of the decision-making process?

Regional tax organizations, i.e., the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) and countries in the African, Caribbean, Latin America and Central American region have highlighted the fast pace of the implementation of the BEPS Project, and the need to provide effective and equitable Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 rules.

Regarding the BEPS Project, some countries have chosen in addition to the BEPS Minimum Standards to implement some of the BEPS Best Practices (Actions 3, 4, 12[22]), but this decision has been a unilateral decision made by each country. However, even if the countries have chosen to implement the BEPS Minimum Standards and some of the BEPS Best Practices, analysis of the peer review reports shows that some countries may choose to do that on paper but not in practice.

Regarding the decision-making process, the discussions of Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 within the BEPS Inclusive Framework have also shown that there is a limited participation of non-OECD, non-G2O countries in decision making. This limited participation was also addressed by the OECD in the report to the G20 under the 2021 Italian Presidency.[23] In the report, the OECD recognized the diverse membership of the Inclusive Framework and the need to ensure greater representation by developing countries in the Inclusive Framework. One of the recommendations of this report was the introduction of a co-chair of the BEPS Inclusive Framework which should be from a non-OECD, non-G20 country. The question is whether the establishment of a developing country co-chair is enough to ensure inclusive participation of developing countries in the decision-making process.

Despite the work done by the OECD and the G20 in the BEPS Project and Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, should decision-making take place at the OECD level, or rather at the United Nations level, and if so, how?

In my view this is the most difficult question to answer at this stage, since the United Nations development is recent (since November 2022). It is also difficult to answer taking into account the changes at the OECD Secretariat, mainly with respect to the position of the Director of the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and Administration. When the BEPS Project started Pascal Saint-Amans was the director, thereafter in 2022, Grace Perez Navarro had this role (temporarily) and was recently replaced by Manal Corwin (former US Tax Advisor and US Tax administration representative) .

At the time that Pascal Saint-Amans was the Director (2012-October 2022), the BEPS Project, BEPS Actions and the proposals for Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 were developed and discussed, including the Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 Political Outcome. There was a clear movement of the OECD towards inviting countries to participate as BEPS Associate in the BEPS Inclusive Framework as well as to commit to the Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 OECD Secretariat Proposal.

Since then, the OECD has been involved in public consultations, model rules and administrative guidance to implement Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. In respect of PiIlar 2 (model rules[24], safe harbour[25], technical administrative guidance[26]) as well as to address issues such as compliance and tax certainty. [27] In respect of Pillar 1, the OECD is still in the process of having public consultations on the design of Amount A[28] and B.[29]

During that time, countries, civil society and some regional tax organizations (ATAF) called for a more decisive role of the United Nations. One of the main reasons is the broader representation of countries in the United Nations vis-à-vis the limited membership of OECD countries where countries are invited to become members following an accession procedure. Furthermore, as I have highlighted before, the participation at the G20 is even more difficult, since it is a political agreement where only few countries are able to participate.

However, times have changed as Nigeria, with the support of some African countries, and Colombia (currently an OECD member country that took part in the BEPS decision making process as OECD Accession country) have also questioned whether there is a fair global tax deal that benefits not only developed but developing countries.

Nevertheless, I am still skeptical about the role of the UN. In my view, for the UN to have a leading role, there should be a coordination between all units (i.e., UNDESA, UNDP, UN Tax Committee). This requires also political will of countries and of the UN Institutions.

For any global international tax body to function either at the UN or as separate international tax body or any international or regional tax organization, it is important to keep in mind that it is not only about the input and output legitimacy, but also about throughput legitimacy (i.e., accountability, transparency, inclusiveness, and responsiveness).[30]

In my view, the OECD, but also any organization/body such as the UN or an independent global tax body, will require throughput legitimacy. Agenda setting and decision-making should be transparent. Furthermore, this body should be held accountable for the decisions taken. The process should also be open to all stakeholders, and responsive to the needs of all countries.

From observing the process that has been carried out since November 2022, in my view, the UN and its Institutions, mainly UNDESA, could be more open and responsive since at this moment, despite the public consultations (one (closed) for countries and another one (open) for other stakeholders) and the publication of documents on the UN website, there is no clarity on who is hiring the experts to present/work in the text of this instrument (either a multilateral convention or a multilateral instrument such as the BEPS MLI) or framework, are all developing countries truly participating, and why are we now discussing a convention, if the resolution mentioned an instrument or framework?

By using the word Convention, (not instrument nor framework), we may assume that all countries will be invited to sign this Convention followed by ratifications including constitutional/legislative review at country level which may take a long time. As we know from ratification of tax treaties, as well as from the lengthy process of ratification of the BEPS Multilateral Instrument, the ratification and entry into force process will take time. What would countries do in the meantime? Introduce unilateral measures, re-negotiate tax treaties, conclude tax treaties, or introduce regional tax treaties.

4.   What is next?

When I started to discuss global tax governance, the BEPS Project just started. 5 years later, we also have Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 proposals, as well as the recent developments that have taken place at the UN level.

Moreover, on 15th of June, the EU Parliament in a resolution on lessons learnt from the Pandora papers and other revelations called for “the EU to support the setting up of a UN framework convention on tax, with the aim of strengthening international cooperation and governance on tax and trade-related illicit financial flows; highlights the need to introduce transparent and inclusive decision-making where all countries can negotiate as equals” (para. 17). But in light of the EU Standard of Tax Governance that I have mentioned above, my question is, is this true? Can developing countries negotiate as equals since non-EU countries, including developing countries, are required to implement BEPS and receive a positive review? I have already addressed my concerns regarding the EU Standard of Tax Governance in my statement at the EU Parliament public hearing on 1st December 2020.[31]

Despite the funding of the GLOBTAXGOV ERC project coming to an end by 31st of July, I will continue addressing these questions in my Chair on Tax Governance at Leiden University, and in my EU Jean Monnet Chair on EU Tax Governance. In my work, I aim to expand my research agenda to inquire under what conditions the role of the United Nations in international tax law making can be legitimate and feasible for developed and developing countries.

This shows that still there is work to be done, and that even though we started with global tax governance addressing issues of legitimacy and feasibility, after 5 years, we have more actors (OECD, EU, UN, regional (tax) organizations, countries, civil society, business, think tanks, etc) and reconciling these goals so that all countries (developed and developing countries) benefit from these changes is still a difficult task. In the framework of the GLOBTAXGOV Research and the EUTAXGOV Jean Monnet Chair, we have asked scholars/civil society among others to express their views in our blogs.[32]

We have also organized several conferences (online and onsite), seminars where we provide a space for dialogue on topics of global tax governance with academia, civil society, international and regional organizations, business, policy makers from different regions in the world.[33] Most of these seminars have been recorded with recordings and slides made available open access.[34]

I will continue with this research by using my network of the GLOBTAXGOV and EUTAXGOV and Leiden University to reach out to developing countries, civil society, regional tax organizations, and scholars in developed and developing countries.

This task is not a one person-task, but a multiple stakeholder task. Therefore cooperation, exchange of knowledge/experiences, sharing publications/presentations via open access, is relevant. Coming from Colombia (an emerging country that only recently joined the OECD), in my Chair, I also want to focus on what these changes in international tax law making could mean for developing countries and for scholars in the global South.


To conclude, international taxation nowadays is not only about the technical rules. The political developments need to be taken into account. In addition, to participate in the international tax law making process and to introduce tax rules, countries should not only have technical knowledge, but also resources and political will to change the rules.

What I have learned since 2018 when I started with my GLOBTAXGOV Project is that the questions of legitimacy, inclusiveness continue being relevant for all stakeholders, and that any process of international tax law making will need to analyze the conditions under which this process can be legitimate and feasible for developed and developing countries. This is true in the BEPS Project but also in the current developments of Pillar 1, Pillar 2 and the UN Tax Resolution. We cannot forget the process, so therefore more attention should be given to transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness.

[1] Dietsch, P., & Rixen, T. (2016). Global tax governance: What it is and why it matters. Global Tax Governance: What Is Wrong with It and How to Fix It, p.3.

[2] accessed 9 June 2023

[3] accessed 9 June 2023

[4] See Mosquera Valderrama. I.J. Trade, Digitalization and Taxation. The Elgar Companion to the WTO. Eds. J. Chaisse and C. Rodriguez-Chiffelle. Forthcoming.

[5] Except Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Kenya. accessed 9 June 2023

[6] accessed 9 June 2023

[7] F. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic, (Oxford University Press 1999) p. 7.

[8] V. Schmidt, (2012) Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and ’Throughput‘, 61 Political Studies, at 17.

[9] See for instance our input with D. Broekhuijsen and E. Arik accessed 9 June 2023

[10] accessed 9 June 2023

[11] See Mosquera Valderrama I.J. The EU Standard of Good Governance in Tax Matters for Third (Non-EU) Countries’, (2019), 47, Intertax, Issue 5, pp. 454-467 accessed 9 June 2023

[12] For an overview of the courses given in the framework of the EU Jean Monnet Chair see accessed 9 June 2023

[13] Mosquera Valderrama I.J. Legitimacy and the Making of International Tax Law: The Challenges of Multilateralism, 7 World Tax J. 3 (2015), Journals IBFD. accessed 9 June 2023

[14] Mosquera Valderrama I.J. Output Legitimacy Deficits and the Inclusive Framework of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative, Bulletin for International Taxation 72(3) 2018 accessed 9 June 2023

[15] OECD (2019), Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy, OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD, Paris, accessed 9 June 2023

[16] Public Consultation Document: Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One (9 October – 12 November 2019. accessed 9 June 2023

[17] Comments of the G-24 on the OECD Secretariat Proposal for a Unified Approach to the Nexus and Profit Allocation Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation (Pillar 1)’ (2019) accessed 9 June 2023

[18]–4179322?view=htmlamp accessed 9 June 2023

[19] Supra n. 11.

[20] Supra n. 12

[21] Supra n.4.

[22] These Actions dealt with Controlled Foreign Company (Action 3), Limitation on Interest Deductions (Action 4), Mandatory Disclosure Rules (Action 12).

[23] See OECD (2021), Developing Countries and the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS: OECD Report for the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, October 2021, Italy, OECD, Paris, at 45. accessed 9 June 2023

[24] Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy – Administrative Guidance on the Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two) ( accessed 9 June 2023

[25] Safe Harbours and Penalty Relief: Global Anti-Base Erosion Rules (Pillar Two) ( accessed 9 June 2023

[26] Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy – Administrative Guidance on the Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two) ( accessed 9 June 2023

[27] Public consultation meeting on compliance and tax certainty aspects of global minimum tax – OECD

[28] Tax challenges arising from digitalisation: Public comments received on the draft Multilateral Convention provisions on digital services taxes and other relevant similar measures under Amount A of Pillar One – OECD accessed 9 June 2023

[29] Tax challenges arising from digitalisation: Public comments received on the design elements of Amount B under Pillar One relating to the simplification of transfer pricing rules – OECD accessed 9 June 2023

[30] Supra n. 13.


[32] accessed 9 June 2023

[33] See link to events and to the YouTube Channel available accessed 9 June 2023

[34] Available at accessed 9 June 2023

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